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Abstract
This review considers Darko Suvin’s recent career anthology Defined by a Hollow with respect to debates
about the relevance of Marxism and utopian critique in the context of a global neoliberal hegemony that
(twenty years after Fukuyama) still imagines itself as the ‘end of history’. Suvin’s work suggests that the
relationship between Marxism and aesthetics in such times is not simply a quirk of the academy, but is
in fact a politically necessary conjoining of materialist praxis and quasi-religious inspiration.
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Volume 6 of the Ralahine Utopian Studies series is a career-spanning anthology of the work of Darko
Suvin, whose paradigm-shifting criticism in the early 1970s almost single-handedly established the
theoretical contours of the still-vibrant field of science-fiction studies and whose contributions remain
40 years later at the core of debates about the relationship between science fiction, utopian thought,
and leftist politics. Retrospective but not backward-looking – and usefully focusing on Suvin’s important
post-1989 work, which may be less familiar to the critics of science fiction who know his work best
– Defined by a Hollow nicely encapsulates decades of criticism and theory from one of our most prolific
and influential citizens (and partisans) of utopia.
A brief look at the dedication page for Defined by a Hollow makes clear the theoretical lineage of
Western Marxism in which Suvin seeks to situate his work. Although the book, he writes, is to bear ‘no
private dedicatees’, ‘it should recall the great ancestors and masters of thinking whose shadows hover
over it, giving inspiration, provoking doubt, testing it and being tested’ (p. ix). The first name listed is Karl
Marx; next follow Lenin, Raymond Williams and Bertolt Brecht, and then Ernst Bloch, Walter Benjamin,
and Fredric Jameson – a veritable gathering of the utopian caucus of the Western Marxist tradition. At
the same time, the dedication ultimately suggests that the book’s grounding is not only in theory but
also in down-to-earth resistive praxis: it concludes with a remembrance of the anti-fascist partisans of
Suvin’s native Yugoslavia, a country whose post-1989 dissolution into chaos and civil war casts a long,
dark shadow over the second half of the anthology.
By now it is nothing new to note that ‘utopia’ may be the most famous pun in literature, with critical
analyses of utopia, utopianism, and utopian form(s) still inevitably beginning with Sir Thomas More’s
coining of the word to famously suggest both eu-topos [the good place] and ou-topos [the non-place].
Science fiction has always contained within itself a similar paradox, suggesting on the one hand a
verisimilitudinous narrative plausibility grounded in genuine scientific knowledge – science fiction as an
extrapolative or even predictive genre, ‘tomorrow’s headlines today’ – and at the same time designating
unrestrained flights of fantasy and irreality, as in the ubiquitous headlines in science journalism that
proclaim the latest finding or gadget as ‘not science fiction, but science fact’. The uneasy, oxymoronic
status of the ‘science’ in ‘science fiction’ – a genre that despite pretensions and protestations to the
contrary remains dominated by such manifestly unscientific absurdities as warp drives, force fields, time
machines, and super powers – is sufficiently troubling that for decades authors and critics of the genre
have generally agreed to just ignore it altogether, preferring alternative categories such as ‘speculative
fiction’ and (even more commonly) the referent-less abbreviation ‘SF’ in an effort to sidestep this
inescapable foundational contradiction as best as can be managed.
The innovation of Darko Suvin in his 1972 essay ‘On the Poetics of the Science Fiction Genre’ – which
became the seed for his most famous and best-read work, 1979’s Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, as
well as subsequent works that helped inaugurate the field of science-fiction studies – was a judo-like
embrace of this opposition that reoriented SF around this very paradox and in the process transformed
both horns of the dilemma. Transmuting an apparently hopeless contradiction into constitutive
antimony, Suvin housed SF’s foundational dialectic between facticity and confabulation in a dialectic he
called cognitive estrangement, which, he argued, is the characteristic aesthetic of the genre and the true
engine of its appeal. Unpacking the two terms, we have cognition – loosely defined as Wissenschaft and
including ‘not only natural but also all the cultural or historical sciences and even scholarship’, not
insignificantly the Marxist tradition among them1 – and estrangement, explicitly derived from the
Russian formalists and Brecht’s famous V-Effekt to denote the opening of the mind to previously

unimagined alternatives that, in turn, cast new and unexpected light on the empirical and the
everyday.2 SF, then, makes use of the modes of cognition native to science and scholarship, but not at all
to predict the future or to research and develop new technologies for technoscience; rather, it does so
to defamiliarise our empirical reality and actually-existing history to give us access to alternative
possibilities and ways of being.
A restatement of this proposition found in a later chapter of Metamorphoses of Science Fiction makes
the interactivity between cognition and estrangement clear: Suvin writes that ‘SF is distinguished by the
narrative dominance of hegemony of a fictional “novum” (novelty, innovation) validated by cognitive
logic’ (p. 69).3 Students of Bloch will recognise Suvin’s borrowing of Bloch’s notion of the novum, which
here becomes science-fictionalised precisely insofar as its newnessis driven by and tethered to
cognition, not only empirical physical science but also (and most essentially) the social sciences, politics,
and history. Nor is the word ‘validate’ chosen lightly – cognition functions as a check upon the
imagination, the only thing keeping it honest. Suvin’s position is that without a relationship to a
cognitive interpretive horizon, SF degrades into mere fantasy, its ‘narrative logic’ no more than ‘overt
ideology plus Freudian erotic patterns’ – and therefore useless for the cause of conceiving and building a
better world than this one. (A line can be drawn from this critique back to Marx’s famous denunciation
of the wishful thinking of the ‘utopian socialists’.) If SF is a ‘hidden parable’ (p. 170) – if the pleasure of
SF comes in judging the reality it depicts against our own physical and social reality – then (so Suvin’s
argument goes) some sort of cognitive reality-principle will always be necessary to structure this
interpretative decoding.
In the chapters from Metamorphoses of Science Fiction that open Defined by a Hollow, we find that the
interplay of cognition and estrangement results in the generation of an ‘imaginative framework
alternative to the author’s empirical environment’ that is always in essence about sketching the
contours of utopia (p. 8). The two genres merge inextricably together, becoming intertwined: prenineteenth-century utopian fiction is reinscribed as ‘an early and primitive branch of SF’ (p. 39), while SF
becomes ‘if not a daughter, yet a niece’ of utopia (p. 43) and contemporary utopian narrative likewise
becomes ‘both an independent aunt and dependent daughter of SF’ (p. 383). For Suvin and the thinkers
who would follow his approach, SF is at once the ‘privileged locus’ (ibid.) for utopian speculation in our
moment but also always firmly situated within utopia’s boundaries. Thus the preoccupation with
futurism and prediction that often characterises approaches to SF becomes completely beside the point,
as does the inevitable scientific nitpicking of fans and non-fans alike. SF instead emerges out of the
dialectic between the real and the imagined to gesture not towards predicted futures but
towards desired ones.
Consequently the ‘science’ of science fiction is for Suvin less about physics than it is about historical
materialism. ‘A novum is fake’, Suvin writes, ‘unless it in some way participates in and partakes of what
Bloch called the “front-line of historical process” – which for him (and for me) as a Marxist means a
process intimately concerned with strivings for a disalienation of people and their social life’ (p.
87).4 Utopia is consequently always from below: ‘All utopias involve people who radically suffer of the
existing system and radically desire to change it’ (p. 30, n. 11).
Elsewhere the point is made even more directly. ‘We need radically liberating novum only’, Suvin writes
in 1997: ‘By “radically liberating” I mean, as Marx did, a quality opposed to simply marking difference: a
novelty that is in critical opposition to degrading relationships between people – and, I strongly suspect,

in fertile relation to memories of a humanized past.’ (pp. 206–7.) SF’s narrative and thematic focus on
the novum is always ultimately about its impact on the lived lives of people, and the ways in which it
makes those lives better or worse – and SF is consequently always in essence about big-‘h’ History,
estranging the reader from the naturalised social relations and class struggles of capitalism so that she
might recognise them, see and feel the urgent need for their reshaping (p. 89).
Naturally Suvin’s definitions of SF have not been accepted without argument in the field, particularly
with respect to his general dismissal of what we might call ‘non-cognitive estrangement’: folklore,
fantasy, and myth. In addition to scholars such as John Rieder and Istvan Csicsery-Ronay Jr. who think
SF’s fantasies of empire mark it out as a genre of the political Right, not the Left, there are those who
think Suvin’s instrumentalist, exclusionary reliance on cognition simply cannot be sustained. A special
issue of Historical Materialism in 2002, edited by Mark Bould and China Miéville, was devoted to the
critique of Suvin’s dismissal of fantasy, with multiple contributors including Fredric Jameson and Carl
Freedman seeking out the possibility of a ‘Marxist fantasy’ that is radical without being ‘cognitive’ in the
Suvinian sense. Such an alternative tradition might turn (as many of the Historical
Materialism contributors do) to the radical fantasy of an author such as Samuel Delany – or they might
instead turn as Jack Zipes does to fairy tales, which, Zipes argues, ‘celebrate humankind’s capacity to
transform the mundane into the utopian as part of a communal project’.5 (For the record, Suvin happens
to think that the vast majority of what is published as SF is essentially non-cognitive as well, and, indeed,
in recent years has loosened the once-sacrosanct boundary between SF and fantasy by conceding that
some fantasies may indeed have radical potential after all.)6
In the recent anthology Red Planets: Marxism and Science Fiction, also edited by Bould and Miéville,
considerations and reconsiderations of Suvin’s emphasis on cognition are likewise the starting point for
nearly every essay in that collection, with many worrying that the very idea of cognition as such might
be suspect. Perhaps the most notable of these is Miéville’s own contribution, which provocatively
argues that Suvin’s cognition may be too bound up with the ideology of capitalist realism to be trusted.
‘To the extent that SF claims to be based on “science,” and indeed on what is deemed “rationality” ’,
Miéville writes, ‘it is based on capitalist modernity’s ideologically projected self-justification: not some
abstract/ideal “science,” but capitalist science’s bullshit about itself’.7 Carl Freedman’s contribution to
the book, however, makes the case that Suvinian ‘cognitive estrangement’ not only remains vital in SF
but that it is in fact the buried logic of Marxism more generally. In his chapter, Freedman identifies a
dialectical disjuncture between what he calls the inflationary and the deflationary modes of Marxist
critique. Deflation is ‘the attempt to destroy all illusions necessary or useful to the preservation of class
society in general and of capitalism in particular’8 – demystification, necessarily grounded in the
knowledge practices Suvin calls cognition. This is Marxism as we typically understand it, as critique. But
Freedman argues that Marxism also requires inflation, which is to say it requires utopia: ‘Marxism
ultimately aims at the positive project of human liberation and self-realisation, rather than only at the
negative task of destroying capitalism and other forms of class (and other) oppression. . . . For Marxism,
visionary transcendence is the necessary completion of astringent demystification.’9 This ‘visionary
transcendence’ is, as Freedman notes, as old as the Manifesto, which famously promised the overthrow
of history itself. Crucially, Freedman’s two modes of critique require each other to function. Without
cognition, we lack the map of the system required to fight capitalism; without estrangement, we would
have no roadmap of where we are headed, and nothing to fight for. In this way the dialectic structuring

science fiction turns out, somewhat unexpectedly, to be precisely the same as the one that structures
Marxism itself.10
That Marxism should begin to resemble science fiction is somehow fitting for the era of neoliberal
ascendency in which we find ourselves, a time in which the very capacity to imagine alterity at all seems
under dire threat. Both Suvin and Phillip Wegner note in their separate excellent Introductions
to Defined by a Hollow a growing disjuncture in Suvin’s work between recognising capitalism
and reshaping it in parallel with the emergence of post-Fordist global capitalist hegemony. While (as
Wegner takes pains to make clear) Suvin is not nostalgic for Soviet or Titoist state communism, the 1989
breakup of the Soviet Union and the subsequent disintegration of Yugoslavia nonetheless stands for
Suvin as proof of ‘the final collapse of the modernist utopian promise of the Bolshevik revolution and
the apparent evaporation of any organised leftwing challenge to the predatory violence of global
capitalism’ (p. xxiv). The essays in the second half of the anthology consequently express an increasingly
dire pessimism about the project of civilisation, as is evident from only a listing of their titles: ‘The
Doldrums: Eight Nasty Poems of 1989–1999’; ‘Where Are We? How Did We Get Here? Is There Any Way
Out?’; ‘Utopia from Orientation to Agency: What Are We Intellectuals under Post-Fordism to Do?’;
‘Inside the Whale, or etsi communismus non daretur: Reflections on How to Live when Communism Is a
Necessity but Nowhere on the Horizon’. The twentieth century becomes refashioned by the later Suvin
as the ‘century of betrayals’, in which ‘the best people, the greatest achievements lead to the worst
horrors’ – a historical wager on hope that did not pay off because ‘the enemies outside and inside
ourselves were too many, too tough’ (p. 362). Capitalism, post-1973 and especially post-1989, is both
dystopia triumphant and a chilling anti-utopia, an evil twin that has stolen all it can from utopia only to
promote its own nightmare of exploitation, oppression, violence, and surveillance in its place (p. 381) –
an infantilising necrosis of history and human agency Suvin frequently shorthands as
‘Disneylandification’ (p. 389 and passim).
At times the precariousness of our situation seems to shift from the register of dystopia – an enemy
which might at least still be resisted – over into out-and-out apocalypse, as when Suvin notes in a 1997
address to the Society for Utopian Studies that the ‘most daring utopia’ we might still hope for today is
no longer ‘Earthly Paradise’ but only ‘the prevention of Hell on Earth’: ‘May the Earth remain our
habitable mother, rather than being pushed by greedy classes and imbecilitated masses (as today) the
way of ecological catastrophe, and the ensuing great Migration of Peoples, the bitter State and
corporation wars, the civil wars of constructed racism and ethnicity!’ (p. 259.) The only viable alternative
to the current catastrophe remains socialism, which in this essay and others shifts the stakes of resisting
capitalism from ending the immiseration of the exploited classes into an existential struggle, a battle for
life itself – in the process solidifying the replacement of the ‘socialism or barbarism’ of the early Marxist
period with its twentieth-century equivalent, Buckminster Fuller’s ‘utopia or oblivion’ (ibid.). Cleverly
twisting Thatcher’s famous proclamation, we find that in an age of disasters there is indeed ‘no
alternative’ – no alternative to utopia (p. 11). In the face of catastrophe and apocalypse, rather than
nihilistically proclaiming the end of time Suvin declares instead the necessity of beginning to build our
arks (p. 207).
In this line of argument Suvin is happy to admit his debt to the well-known work of Fredric Jameson,
who has similarly made his reputation discovering the dreams of utopia still lurking behind even the
worst horrors. In ‘Utopia as Replication’ – a follow-up and partial reconsideration of
his 2005 Archaeologies of the Future that was reprinted as a chapter in 2010’s Valences of the Dialectic –

Jameson too notes the parade of disasters that threaten not only the ability to live a non-alienated life
but also the very possibility of life as such (ecological catastrophe, global poverty, widespread structural
unemployment, endlessly proliferating wars, to only begin to name them) before pessimistically
admitting ‘that in each of these areas no serious counterforce exists anywhere in the world, and
certainly not in the United States, which is itself the cause of most of them’.11 For Jameson, as for Suvin,
the extreme hopelessness of the situation is only further proof of postmodernity’s fundamental
incapacity to imagine utopia. (This is the peculiar sense in which utopia is ‘defined by a hollow’, that is,
defined by its very absence.) This incapacity in turn directs Jameson to privilege problems of utopian
form over utopian content, focusing on the way utopia structures our most cherished imaginings and
undergirds all political praxis, even and perhaps especially when we are not consciously aware of it.12
Valences ends with a similar call to imagine utopia not as something cognisable or realisable in our
actual lives but as the ‘absolute negation’ of our actual history, even as a kind of parallel world, of which
we can obtain only the most furtive (if most necessary) glimpses.13 Utopia is able to survive, this is all to
say, even its apparent disproof. It is in this sense that Jameson can make the seemingly counterintuitive
declaration that ‘the worldwide triumph of capitalism . . . secures the priority of Marxism as the ultimate
horizon of thought in our time’.14 The stronger capitalism becomes, the stronger Marxism remains as its
necessary other, its inevitable critique. Marxism remains the truth of capitalism’s basic insufficiency, the
ghost of its supersession that it can never hope to extirpate.
Jamesonian Marxism has sometimes been derided – unfairly – as a ‘Marxism of failure’, in which our
failures to achieve or even imagine a better world are somehow made to count as much or more than
our successes. But the point has never been to build a beautiful monument to failure; it is to mobilise
those failures into a new resolve and start again. Utopia is not some static achievable end-state, not a
sweet reward for the virtuous; it is, as SF author Kim Stanley Robinson (a former student of Jameson,
and a favourite of both Jameson and Suvin) memorably put it in his 1995 utopian novel Pacific Edge, a
‘dynamic, tumultuous, agonizing process, with no end. Struggle forever’.15 No-one said it would be easy.
The second half of Defined by a Hollow follows this basically Jamesonian trajectory but at the same time
makes clear just how diminished this on-going utopian struggle has become in times as dark as ours.
Reading Suvin one cannot escape the sense that we will all go to our graves still fearing that utopia has
only ever been a lie. In one essay – ‘Utopianism from Orientation to Agency’ – the promised moment of
agency never actually arrives; Suvin instead admits that ‘having arrived within hailing distance of the end
of our species and perhaps of vertebrate life on Earth, the wonderful but possibly somewhat elite form
of the scholarly essay begins at the end to fail me’ (p. 260). Desperate to be told some secret plan, or at
least to be pointed to the exit before the rest of the theatre burns down, Suvin’s readers instead receive
five short maxims about utopia that, horrifyingly, place the burden of utopia’s rebirth on us ourselves.
Having established the ever-accelerating speed with which humanity is barrelling towards its own
destruction, having named the problem so convincingly that no solution seems adequate or even
possible, the essay’s final epigram, ‘Do not expect from utopia more than from yourselves’, takes on a
disturbing double valence, especially when paired with the quote from Kierkegaard that begins the
piece: ‘We literally do not want to be what we are’ (p. 218).
If we can expect no more from utopia than what we are, and we do not want to be what we are, then
somehow we must find some way to change. And much more than Jameson, Suvin is a believer in the
power of utopia to mould us and change us – and (again in distinction from Jameson) locates this power

not only in the furtive glimpses of utopian form but also in the explicit plan-making and solidaritycrafting of utopian content. Utopia is, after all, a ‘verbal construction’, an estrangement ‘created by
discontented social classes interested in otherness and change’ (p. 30; including 2008 revision in n. 11,
emphasis mine). That is, utopia isitself a kind of political praxis – it is a built thing, shaped and crafted, a
story we tell ourselves to keep going and to remind ourselves of where it is that we are supposed to be
going in the first place. In this light, poetry and art emerge as competitors to the sorts of thinking we call
theory, or even as secret species of theory in their own right: ‘Poetry (artistic production) is thus
potentially a privileged form for conveying and constituting cognition, for humanizing it by means of
figures and events recalling but also modifying the life-world, and for understanding what cognition is
and may be. . . . Thus, following Benjamin, worlds of art may (in the best cases) present us with radically
different and/or radically better experiences, whose shapings are then guides to salvation.’ (p. 298.)
In Defined by a Hollow this valorisation of poetry is fully realised; Suvin’s poetry is granted several
chapters alongside his prose.
Of course, if telling a pretty story about utopia were sufficient to create utopia the struggle could end
here; justice would have already rained down from the heavens with the publication of the first
modernist classics, socialism established forever on the strength of the first science-fictional utopias.
Art, poetry, utopia – all are of course useless without action, without organisation, without collectivity
and political struggle. Suvin is as aware as anyone of the risk that the dream of utopia might be mistaken
for a real one – he has not forgotten Disneylandification, nor the way that free-market neoliberalism
presents itself as a utopia already realised – but he nonetheless reminds us that the dream of another,
better world remains the first and necessary step towards achieving it.
If this all begins to sound a bit like religion, it should; one of the final essays in Defined by a Hollow is an
explicit call for a ‘a new value system, centred in liberation of labour and creativity’, that will function as
a materialist replacement for religion (in an evolutionary sense, standing in relation to religion ‘as lungs
are to gills’) focusing on salvation in what Suvin frequently calls the ‘this-worldly’, the here and now (p.
481). Following Gramsci, and echoing Freedman, Suvin repeatedly insists that an orientation towards
utopia – ‘an optimism of the will’ – remains the necessary companion of ‘pessimism of the intellect’ (pp.
396, 485). We must, indeed, have both. Facts, figures, and a cool appraisal of the machines and
mechanisms of repression are not by themselves sufficient to craft a politics – as much as these we need
a ‘salvational doctrine for one and all’ that kicks in before we die, not after. ‘Without it’, Suvin writes –
without utopia – ‘any liberatory movement shall fail: no revolution without revelation’ (p. 499).
The historical relationship between Marxism and literary theory in this light turns out to be not some
contingent quirk of the academy, but necessary and vital – and the presence of utopian cognition in arts
and literature an essential part of the Marxist project as a whole. Suvin’s is a Marxism that requires
beauty, a Marxism that is itself beautiful. ‘We need to realize’, Suvin writes, ‘that there is no poetry
without communism, and no communism without poetry. All poets know this, often in fantastic
metamorphoses; few communists have allowed their suspicions to flower’ (p. 377). Such a proclamation
unexpectedly promotes Emma Goldman’s famous (if misattributed) exclamation to the level of a
fundamental axiom. Not only ‘if I can’t dance, I don’t want your revolution’; if I can’t dance – and paint,
and film, and write, and dream of better times than these – there can be no revolution in the first place.

Notes
1. Suvin 1979, p. 13.
2. Suvin 1979, p. 6.
3. Also in Suvin 1979, p. 63.
4. Also in Suvin 1979, pp. 81–2.
5. Zipes 2002, p. xiii.
6 . ‘Let me therefore revoke, probably to general regret, my blanket rejection of fantastic fiction. The
divide between cognitive (pleasantly useful) and noncognitive (useless) does not run between SF and
fantastic fiction but inside each – though in rather different ways and in different proportions, for there
are more obstacles to liberating cognition in the latter.’ (Suvin 2000, p. 211.)
7 . Miéville 2009, p. 240.
8. Freedman 2009, p. 72.
9. Freedman 2009, pp. 72–3.
10. For more on this subject and on the relationship between science fiction and Marxism, see my
review of Red Planets, ‘Marxism as Science Fiction’ (Canavan 2010).
11. Jameson 2010, p. 412.
12. ‘This kind of prospective hermeneutic is a political act only in one specific sense: as a contribution to
the reawakening of the imagination of possible and alternate futures, a reawakening of that historicity
which our system – offering itself as the very end of history – necessarily represses and paralyzes. This is
the sense in which utopology revives long-dormant parts of the mind, organs of political and historical
and social imagination which have virtually atrophied for lack of use, muscles of praxis we have long
since ceased exercising, revolutionary gestures we have lost the habit of performing, even subliminally.
Such a revival of futurity and of the positing of alternate futures is not itself a political program nor even
a political practice: but it is hard to see how any durable or effective political action could come into
being without it.’ ( Jameson 2010, p. 434.)
13. Jameson 2010, p. 612.
14. Jameson 2010, p. 605.
15. Robinson 1995, p. 95.
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